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ing Hobbes, the author passes in review the theories of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid, with only occasional glances at other British thinkers, and leaving all since Reid unmentioned, so that his treatment of this part of his subject is incomplete. Passing next to the Continent, he presents the views of Descartes and his successors down to Leibnitz, and those of Kant and other German thinkers as far as Lotze, closing his historical survey with the last-named writer. His reason for not treating the latest writers is that many of them have studied the will by the methods of science rather than by those of philosophy, and consequently their work requires to be dealt with separately. The evolution theory in particular has, in his opinion, almost revolutionized psychology, and he thinks it "not unreasonable to expect that the genesis of conscious volition may be explained, not only by the more rudimentary processes in the child, but also by the phenomena presented in the lower animals" (p. vii). For my part, I have no faith in evolutionism as a key to the problem of the will, or to any other problem in philosophy; but the attention lately given to the study of the will itself and its relations to other mental facts, on the one hand, and to bodily states, on the other, gives promise of good results.

Mr. Alexander tells us in his preface that this book is the first of a series dealing with the will problem, and that its object is to introduce a constructive theory of the will, on which he has been engaged for some years. He gives no intimation, however, of what his theory is, nor even of his position on the question of determinism or its opposite. Nor does he introduce any criticism in this book except in a few cases, and then chiefly for the purpose of showing more clearly the real character of the theory he is dealing with. The book is certainly a valuable addition to the philosopher's library, and its value is enhanced by the style in which it is written; a style not so strong as some, but clear and refined, and of uniform excellence throughout. Those who read the book will look with interest for the remaining volumes of the series.

JAMES B. PETERSON.

The Groundwork of Science. A Study of Epistemology. By ST. GEORGE MIVART. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons; London, Bliss, Sands & Co., 1898.—pp. xviii, 328.

During the last twenty-five years there has been a growing interest, among scientific men, in the problems of epistemology. This is especially noticeable in England and Germany. The present work comes from the hand of a prominent biologist. To those who are acquainted with Mr. Mivart's *Essays and Criticisms*, 1892, and his *Elements of Science*, 1894, together with the neo-scholastic literature on the theory of knowledge, the volume before us will afford little fresh interest. Yet one may say there is probably no recent work that more candidly lets one into the venerable combination of psychological with metaphysical realism, or that puts a more varied emphasis on Tongiorgi's thesis: "Truth is an equation or a conformity of thought to thing."

After an introductory chapter we have the following captions: An enumeration of the sciences, the objects of science, the methods of science, the physical antecedents of science, the psychical antecedents of science, language and science, intellectual antecedents of science, causes of scientific knowledge, the nature of the groundwork of science. A more general classification of the contents of the work is given on page 296, as the matter of science, the tools of science, and the nature of the worker in science. Mivart's main contentions in introducing the matter of science are: "We are perfectly convinced that objects and substances can, because they do, exist apart from our own mind and apart from any mind that we can have any direct knowledge of, or even imagine as existing" (p. 42); and "all science is essentially abstract although derived from and accurately applicable to real concrete states of real concrete things" (p. 7). It is held also that if idealism were true, physical science would be a dream (pp. 49–54). Realism has on its side the spontaneous judgment of mankind, the dictum of our own minds, and the results of science, while the main attraction of idealism "consists in the fact that the system is exceedingly easy of comprehension" (pp. 45–47). The matter of science is subdivided into "the physical and material, and the mental and ideal," both of which we know that we know by indubitable intellectual intuition. "Self-evidence is the necessary and only criterion of truth." Mivart sides with Hegel against Spencer, holding that we can only explain the lower by the higher. The senses, although they never deceive us, can never be a criterion of judgment (pp. 71, 278–9). Against the phenomenalists and relativists he urges: "Either this system is merely uncertain and cannot be known to be true, or else it is absolutely true and can be known so to be" (281). Although Mivart lays great stress upon "ordinary reason," and will have science nothing other than ordinary reason, yet we are told that there are no such things as space and time, that "what motion denotes cannot really exist in the concrete," and that "matter pure and simple shows no signs of existing *in rerum natura.*" More than this, Mivart will not allow either heredity or natural selection to play a rôle in developing these fundamental ideas. He is probably right in holding that they proceed under the regular formula, "heads I win, tails you lose," yet they do furnish some sort of an excuse for holding psychological realism.

The spirit of the work is more clearly understood when the author comes to consider the tools of science, the organs of sense, the ordinary reason, and the following fundamental principles which are so self-evident that "any scientific man who should deny any one of them would either deceive himself or try to deceive other people" (p. 106). These certainties are: the existence of certainty, the existence of an external world, our continuous substantial existence, the validity of the process of inference, the self-evidence of some truths, the principle of contradiction, the evidence of axioms, the principle of causation, the uniformity of nature, and the existence of necessity and contingency (pp. 106, 264, 316). These ten certainties remind us of the ten tropes of Ænesidemus. It still remains to be asked, Why should we admit the one series rather than the other? The assertion that we know that we know the one series seems to beg the question at issue. Take, for instance, the principle of the uniformity of nature, with which the principles of continuity and causation are so closely associated, it is by no means clear that the author himself has not jeopardized its scientific application by introducing so many breaks in nature. "There is an absolute break" between the organic and the inorganic world (p. 212), between chemical elements before and after synthesis (p. 283), "between everything that feels and everything devoid of sensation" (p. 287), between language of feeling and language of thought or between animals and man (p. 212); "new existences are continually arising within the world" (p. 289).

As regards the worker, he is to avoid being like the fisherman in the drama whose eulogy on his deceased lord was, "he was so fond of fish." Forsaking the bias of specialization, he must be sure of his personal identity, and confide in reason which he will find latent and implied in all the matter of science, even in the crystal. Once it is asserted that "function depends on structure," again that function and structure are interdependent, although there are not wanting indications of a deeper view that structure depends on function. Though much emphasis is put on the telic character of instinct and immanent reason (or will), the author clearly does not accept hylozoistic teleology. He is convinced, however, that no satisfactory epistemology is possible apart from the conception of an active causative principle underlying and pervading the material cosmos.

Although the work is full of interest and suggestion, it can scarcely be regarded as a successful study of epistemology. Idealism is treated too much as a system of negatives, while realism is uncritically compounded. But epistemology is not simply an issue between idealism and realism. In any adequate view of the field, some attention should be given to the analysis of experience to show how the antithesis of the outer and the inner arises. All this and much more is excluded from consideration. Indeed we are told: "We know things and we know that we know them. How we know them is a mystery indeed, but one about which it is idle to speculate, as it is absolutely insoluble. The oft-repeated question, 'How is knowledge possible?' is, therefore, one of the most idle and futile questions which can be asked" (p. 56). "All inquiries into the origin and causes of our convictions are futile for epistemology" (p. 275). We close our too imperfect notice by a word from Lichtenberg: "*Die gemeinsten Meinungen und was jedermann für ausgemacht hält, verdiente oft am meisten untersucht zu werden.*"

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Studies of Good and Evil. A Series of Essays upon Problems of Philosophy and of Life. By JOSIAH ROYCE, Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University. New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1898.—pp. xvii, 384.

Professor Royce has in former books presented, in more or less detail, the arguments for philosophical idealism. In the present volume, he is mainly concerned, as he himself tells us, with the application of this doctrine to concrete and practical problems of life. Idealism "is not, as many have falsely supposed, a theory of the world founded merely upon *a priori* speculation, and developed solely in the closet. It is, and in its best historical representatives always has been, an effort to interpret the facts of life" (pp. iii, iv). By employing his idealist doctrine to throw light upon various complex problems of man's psychological and moral nature, Professor Royce not only furnishes the best test of its truth in its power of explaining facts, but this contact with actual experience seems to react upon the theory itself, and to render it more many-sided and richer, even from a speculative point of view.

The essays of which the volume is composed have the following